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Making Climate Change  
Policy Work at the Local Level:  
Capacity-Building for 




This study will examine the state of local capacity building for local climate 
adaptation in Japan. Climate mitigation needs to be led by both global 
strategies and national mandates in an integrated way, but climate change 
impacts are manifested locally and adaptive capacity is determined by local 
conditions. The article first lays out the basic components of local capacity 
for decentralized policy making and assesses the current local capacity in 
view of Japan’s climate policy. The bulk of data employed in the study is 
derived from existing up-to-date government databases. It found that only 
the largest municipalities as well as prefectures have governing capacities to 
develop a comprehensive approach to climate adaptation, while medium-
sized municipalities have a potential to take a participatory approach 
to climate policy. It argues that some pioneering localities realize their 
potentials to take initiatives under political leadership but most localities 
act in a piecemeal fashion according to clear national-level guidance on 
climate change.





n the 1970s, Japanese local government was known for its progressive 
policy of industrial pollution control, with other Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries emulating 
Japan’s local environmental innovations. In the late 1960s, when industrial 
__________________
* I gratefully acknowledge the extensive and constructive comments of anonymous reviewers 
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pollution fuelled local environmental activism in Japan, it became apparent 
that the centralized image of Japan would require a closer examination. Some 
scholars suggested that Japan was less centralized than most academic Japan-
specialists had initially thought and its local government system had much 
more discretion than they had expected.1 In the absence of national legislation, 
Japanese local governments, pressured at the time by developing movements 
of residents in their pollution-affected localities, exercised their discretionary 
power for policy innovations.2 They played a critical role in policy diffusion to 
the national level to tackle pollution problems.
However, the local policy environment appears to have significantly 
changed over the last two decades. Japan’s local environmental responses 
have shifted from predominantly contentious activities in domestic politics 
to a far more complex process that involves both local coordination with 
national policy and local adaptations to global environmental strategies. 
On the global level, the importance of local policy making can be traced 
back to ideas incorporated in Agenda 21 (an action plan of sustainable 
development adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit), with emphasis on the local 
level of participation, the layer of government closest to the people.3 Ever 
since the acknowledgement of a vital community role in the implementation 
of global strategies for sustainable development within the Agenda 21 
framework, the position of local communities has been further promoted 
and strengthened by a series of decision making at both the national and 
international levels. In 1993 the International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) launched the notion of Local Agenda 21, 
a participatory, multi-sectoral process, in which local participants voluntarily 
create long-term, strategic action plans and implement them to achieve 
sustainability by integrating environmental, social and economic priorities.4 
Article 34 of Japan’s Basic Environmental Law, which was enacted in the 
same year, acknowledged the role of local governments as the subjects of 
international environmental cooperation. 
The local level of participation in climate change policy is increasingly 
expected for two basic grounds: the need for locally specific responses to 
global strategies and the need for a decentralized form of redistributing 
__________________
1 Richard Samuels, The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983); Steven Reed, Japanese Prefectures and Policy Making (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1986).
2 Michio Muramatsu, “The Impact of Economic Growth Policies on Local Politics in Japan,” 
Asian Survey 15, no. 9 (September 1975): 799-816; Kurt Steiner, Ellis Krauss and Scott Flanagan, eds., 
Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Steven 
Reed, “Environmental Politics: Some Reflections Based on the Japanese Case,” Comparative Politics 13, 
no. 3 (April 1981): 253-69.
3 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21. Rio de Janeiro: 
UNCED, 3-14 June 1992; available from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/
english/adenda21toc.htm, last accessed 3 December 2009.
4 International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, The Local Agenda 21 Initiative: ICLEI 
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
global environmental functions.5 Global strategies for environmental risk 
reduction require local action while local environmental problem solving 
demands global coordination.6 From the viewpoint of local policy making, 
the central issue boils down to local authorities’ willingness and capability 
of contributing to problem solving to cater for both locally specific needs 
and global strategies. Yet the key problem for local capacity building is an 
inadequate delegation of power to lower levels of government.7 Firstly, in 
many countries, local governments do not have the fiscal capacity to include 
funding requirements into their environmental programs. Second, they 
often lack sufficient jurisdiction over the implementation of environmental 
policies. Equally important, there exist two fundamental blockages within 
local administrations: lack of information and expertise and incapability of 
interdepartmental coordination.8 From the viewpoint of multi-level 
governance, action at local scales cannot be effective in isolation from 
components of the institutional frameworks at national scales.9 The 
reputation of Japanese local governments for being innovative in the 1970s 
is well worth inquiry into their adaptation to the new policy environment. 
The case of Japan’s efforts at local capacity building offers an opportunity 
to examine how to make climate change policy work at the local level.
Analytical Frameworks
There has been a great deal in the literature on the advantages of 
decentralized public policy. Earlier research on decentralized decision 
making for service delivery found numerous benefits. First, as environmental 
problems are often location-specific, differences in geographical areas can 
be effectively dealt with in decentralized decision making.10 Second, 
__________________
5 Michael Shuman, Toward a Global Village: International Community Development Initiatives 
(London: Pluto, 1994); Lara Green, Chris Game and Simon Delay, Why Should My Local Authorities be 
Involved in an Overseas Project? (Birmingham: Birmingham University, 2005).
6 Hugh Dyer, “Environmental Ethics and International Relations,” Paradigms 8, no. 1 (Summer 
1994): 58-77; Karen Litfin, “Advocacy Coalitions along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Globalization 
and Canadian Climate Change Policy,” Policy Studies Journal 28, no. 1 (2000): 236-52.
7 Harriet Bulkeley and Heike Schroeder, “Governing Climate Change Post-2012: The Role of 
Global Cities Case-Study - Los Angeles,” Working Paper 122, Wallingford, UK, Tyndall Center for 
Climate Change Research, 2008; Kristine Kern and Alber Gotelind, “Governing Climate Change in 
Cities: Modes of Urban Climate Governance in Multi-Level Systems,” OECD Conference Proceedings, 
Paris, OECD, 2009.
8 Claudia Holgate, “Factors and Actors in Climate Change Mitigation: A Tale of Two South 
African Cities,” Local Environment 12, no. 5 (2007): 471-84; Barry Rabe, “Governing the Climate from 
Sacramento,” in Unlocking the Power of Networks, eds., Stephen Goldsmith and Donald Kettl (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 34-61.
9 Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom and Paul Stern, “The Struggle to Govern the Commons,” Science 
302 (2003): 1907-12; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types 
of Multi-Level Governance,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (May 2003): 233-43. 
10 Thomas H. Tietenberg, “On the Efficient Spatial Allocation of Air Pollution Control 
Responsibility,” in Regional Environmental Policy: The Economic Issues, eds. Horst Siebert, Ingo Walker 
and Klaus Zimmermann (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 79-83; Horst Siebert, Economics 
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decentralized units are positioned well to make the processing of interest 
articulation and aggregation easier since public preferences are available in 
the immediate environment11 or as voters move from one community to 
another to satisfy their service preferences.12 Third, the specific operations 
of decentralization provide the chances for enhancing the visibility of service 
performance and the traceability of responsibility, and thus increase 
accountability to stakeholders.13 Lastly, subject to inter-jurisdictional 
competition, decentralized control over the economy responds to citizens’ 
needs as well as prevents the central government from interfering with 
markets.14 
What government level of policy making then is better suited for 
environmental issues? The impact of decentralized governance on 
environmental quality has been documented in the empirical literature but 
evidence reported in a number of studies shows mixed results. Some studies 
provide evidence that devolving authority did result in inefficient regulatory 
competition or “a race to the bottom” that would lower environmental quality 
to compete for capital.15 They also report evidence of “free riding” by 
subnational governments that chose lower environmental standards than 
the national government would choose, to export the environmental costs 
to their neighbours.16 Others argue that there is no evidence of such 
destructive regulatory competition and many subnational governments do 
not even exercise their discretion in favour of lower environmental 
standards.17 These results appear to be mixed yet a list of preconditions 
necessary for decentralized environmental policies to be efficient would 
explain these apparently mixed results in a more consistent way. For 
decentralization to realize the potential benefits of efficiency and equitability, 
the literature suggests several capacity-based preconditions: intergovernmental 
__________________
11 Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1972).
12 Charles Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” The Journal of Political Economy 64, 
no. 5 (October 1956): 416-24. 
13 George Peterson, Decentralization in Latin America: Learning through Experience (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 1997). 
14 Barry R. Weingast, “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving Federalism 
and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 1-31; 
Ronald McKinnon, “The Logic of Market-preserving Federalism,” Virginia Law Review 83, no. 7 
(October 1997): 1573-80.
15 Per G. Fredriksson and Daniel Millimet, “Strategic Interaction and the Determination of 
Environmental Policy across US states,” Journal of Urban Economics 51, no. 1 (January 2002): 101-22; 
Arik Levinson, “Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New Evidence,” 
National Tax Journal 56, no. 1 (March 2003): 91-106.
16 Eric Helland and Andrew Whitford, “Pollution Incidence and Political Jurisdiction: Evidence 
from the TRI,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46, no. 3 (November 2003): 403-24; 
Hilary Sigman, “Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies,” Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 50, no. 1 (July 2005): 82-101.
17 John List and Shelby Gerking, “Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the 
Unites States,” Journal of Regional Science 40, no. 3 (August 2000): 453-71; Wallace E. Oates, “A 
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism,” in Recent Advances in Environmental Economics, eds., 
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
cooperation at the sub-national level without centralized intervention;18 fiscal 
autonomy and discretion;19 administrative capacity;20 democratic political 
institutions;21 responsive local officials;22 and civic engagement.23 
In this article, while drawing on the above literature, as table 1 shows, 
local capacity necessary for policy decentralization to be effective is examined 
from two viewpoints: Performance Evaluations and Citizens’ Orientations. The 
evaluations of local government performance draw on two fundamental 
causal paths: governmental procedures (the quality of representational links 
between citizens and local government: accountability and attentiveness) 
and governmental performance (the evaluations of policy making and 
implementation activities of local government: efficiency and fairness). The 
orientations of citizens are linked into two causal paths: the individual’s 
subjective makeup of political involvement (personal orientations and 
expectations) and the interpersonal makeup of social relations relevant to 
collective action (collective orientations and expectations among citizens).
The quality of governmental procedures requires two basic conditions: 
accountability mechanisms (referring to a mechanism that allows wide, effective 
participation in light of the governmental ability to provide access and to 
hold officials accountable) and officials’ attentiveness (officials’ actual 
attentiveness to what the people think).24 The equality of accountability can 
be observed by assessing the institutional mechanisms of linkage process 
that relates the government to the citizenry. These include climate-change-
specific ones such as Local Agenda 21, action plans and environmental 
impact assessments. The accountability mechanisms are crucial structures 
of legitimate government, but they are effective to the extent that officials 
__________________
18 Paul Shapiro and Jeffrey Petchey, “The Welfare Economics of Environmental Regulatory: Two 
Parables on State vs. Federal Control,” in The Economic Theory of Environmental Policy in a Federalism, 
New Horizons in Environmental Economics, eds., John B. Braden and Stef Proost (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publisher, 1997), 122-46.
19 Paul Seabright, “Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts 
Model,” European Economic Review 40, no. 1 (January 1996): 61-89.
20 Ariel Fiszbien, “The Emergence of Local Capacity: Lessons from Colombia,” World Development 
25, no. 7 (July 1997): 1029-43; Anne M. Larson, “Natural Resources and Decentralization in Nicaragua: 
Are Local Governments up to the Job?” World Development 30, no. 1 (January 2002): 17-31; Asian 
Development Bank, Capacity Building to Support Decentralization in Indonesia (Manila: ADB, 2005). 
21 Richard Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in Southeast Asia and West Africa; 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Krister Andersson and Frank van Laerhoven, “From 
Local Strongman to Facilitator: Institutional Incentives for Participatory Municipal Governance in 
Latin America,” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 9 (September 2007): 1085-111.
22 Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and 
Measurement,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 4 (July 2004): 481-500.
23 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); Edward P. Weber, Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental 
Regulation (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998); Paul Selman, “Social Capital, 
Sustainability and Environmental Planning,” Planning Theory and Practice 2, no. 1 (April 2001): 13-30.
24 The accountability mechanism for monitoring provides incentives for the attentiveness of 
officials to constituents. But it is procedurally operational only to the extent that officials recognize 
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acknowledge the incentive structures designed to increase their attentiveness. 
Evidence of officials’ attentiveness can be sought in the incentive structures 
of climate change, such as environmental performance disclosure and 
personnel management.
The quality of governmental performance is tapped by two conditions: 
officials’ efficiency (officials’ capacity to accomplish their tasks without undue 
waste of time or resources) and fairness of government outputs (fairness of cost-
sharing in local government’s outputs). These two conditions address 
procedural efficiency and overall fairness respectively. Key indicators for such 
efficiency in climate policy, as discussed later, are chief executives’ leadership, 
administrative ability and fiscal capacity. In this policy area, fairness involves 
mitigation cost-sharing rather than potential benefits of environmental risk 
reduction, since these benefits are both non-excludable and non-rival. As 
indicated in this study, environmental impact assessment at early stages and 
citizen involvement are a minimal condition for overall fairness.
Table 1 
Local Capacity for Decentralized Policy Making
 Dimension Definition Empirical indicators
Governmental Accountability Access to hold Institutions that press
procedures mechanisms officials  officials  to take account 
  accountable of citizens’ views
 Officials’  Attentiveness Facts if officials actually 
 attentiveness to public take proper accounts
  preference of citizens’ views
Governmental  Officials’ Ability to Efficiency of leadership
performance efficiency perform tasks and administration
  efficiently  
 Fairness of  Fairness of Wide, effective 
 government  cost-sharing participation 
 outputs
Citizens’ Political Responsibility Interest in politics
orientations interest for citizen
  participation 
 Political  Prospect for Perception of 
 efficacy successful government institutions 
  citizen  
  participation 
 Interpersonal  Shared Trust in people 
 trust expectations
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
The subjective makeup of political involvement is shaped by two prominent 
conditions: political interest (personal feelings of responsibility for citizen 
participation) and political efficacy (personal feelings about the prospect for 
successful citizen participation).25 In addition to predispositions, social 
networks provide a potential for a higher level of political participation. The 
interpersonal makeup of social relations is accounted for by a primary 
condition: interpersonal trust (shared expectations situated in relationships 
between citizens).26 The subjective and interpersonal makeup can be observed 
by citizens’ perceptions.
The following section will assess the Japanese local capacity to meet locally 
specific conditions as well as national policy frameworks and international 
agreements while drawing on the analytical framework of those key components.
Political Involvement
Political interest 
Today Japanese public concerns about climate change are particularly high: 
a 2007 government survey found that 92.3 percent of the public expressed 
levels of concern ranging from “very” or “modest.”27 If major trends in public 
opinion are paralleled by coverage in the mass media, then a near explosion 
of climate change coverage that began in 1989 indicates a sudden upward 
trend in public awareness about climate change. Newspaper articles with key 
words, chikyū kankyō (global environment) and/or chikyū ondanka (global 
warming), increased rapidly in number from 7 in 1986 through 1,430 in 
1989 to 2,633 in 1992 when the Earth Summit took place.28 Yet, a number 
of studies found that, despite the public awareness, societal actors were yet 
to be mobilized to influence the policy-making process.29 In the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the Japanese politics of industrial pollution involved the costs 
of industrial poisoning, and the visible costs of human life itself. The 
__________________
25 The indices for citizens’ orientations are adopted from the civic culture literature: Gabriel A. 
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), chapters 
10, 11 and Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972), chapters 9-13.
26 The index for interpersonal trust is adopted from the social capital literature: Robert D. 
Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993), chapter 6. 
27 Japan, Cabinet Office, Chikyū Ondanka Taisaku ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa [Public opinion survey 
on global warming countermeasures]; available from http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h19/h19-
globalwarming/index.html, last accessed 12 November 2009. 
28 The figures are calculated by the author from two major national newspapers (i.e., through 
on-line indexing services provided by digital news archives): Asahi Shinbun and Yomiuri Shinbun.
29 Miyauchi Taisuke, “Kankyō Jichi no Shikumizukuri” [Environmental self-governance and its 
organization], Kankyō Shakaigaku Kenkyū [Journal of Environmental Sociology] 7 (2001): 56-71; Wada 
Takeshi, “Nijūisseiki no Chikyū Kankyō to Shakai Hatten” [The Earth’s environment for the twenty-
first century and social development], Yuibutsuron to Gendai [Materialism and Today] 29 (May 2002): 
2-15; Hasegawa, Kōichi, Kankyō Undō to Atarashii Kokyōken [Environmental movements and new public 
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immediate causes of industrial pollution, unlike non-industrial pollution, 
were easy to identify and confront. In contrast, in the 1990s the objectives 
of Japan’s environmental policy moved away from one-dimensional pollution 
control toward a sustainable society and environment. The general public 
had limited capacity to confront diffused, “no-point sources” of pressures 
on the environment. The low visibility of long-term mitigation benefits that 
the general public is supposed to receive tends to prevent the general public 
from citizen participation.30 In this context, the importance of environmental 
education has already been identified by local authorities and a range of 
climate change education in the curriculum of schools has been implemented 
across the nation.31 
Political efficacy 
According to a survey by the company NTT Data, the lower the level of 
government, the higher the citizens’ expectations of representation. The 
survey asked who “should decide on important issues of municipal 
governance.” A high of 88 percent of respondents answered, “Residents 
should directly participate in decision-making,” in sharp contrast to only 11 
percent answering, “Publicly elected representatives should decide.” 
Although a mere 8 percent had experienced direct participation in such 
decision making at some level, 37 percent had not yet had a chance to 
participate but wished to do so when the opportunity arose.32 This is a 
significant percentage of potentially proactive citizens. It is clear that there 
is plenty of room for the incorporation of local environmental policy making 
into inclusive democracy building.
As the same survey shows that 47 percent felt their views to be represented 
at the municipal level while only 8 percent felt so at the national level, 
Japanese local governments are relatively trusted institutions. Indeed, 
positions as local civil servants are deemed to be one of the most desirable 
jobs among university graduates.33 Yet Japanese local governments are now 
__________________
30 Hasegawa, Kankyō Undō to Atarashii Kokyōken; Hiraoka Shun’ichi and Wada Takeshi, “Chihō 
Jichitai ni okeru Shiminsankagata no Chikyū Ondanka Taisaku o Suishinsuru Shikumi to Shakaiteki 
Haikei” [Political system and social background for the promotion of climate mitigation through 
citizens participation in local government], Ritsumeikan Sangyōshakai Ronshū [Ritsumeikan University 
Industrial Society Papers] 41, no. 2 (September 2005): 49.
31 Wada Takeshi and Taura Kenrō, Shimin Chiiki ga Susumeru Chikyū Ondanka Bōshi [Climate 
change countermeasures by citizens and community] (Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppan, 2007), 132-52; 
Kitagawa Hideki (ex-Kyoto Prefecture official of Bureau of the Environment), interview by author, 
13 May 2010, Kyoto; Taura, interview by author, 13 May 2010, Kyoto; Japan Center for Climate Change 
Actions, “Chiiki no Dōkō” [Regional Trends]; available from http://www.jccca.org/trend_region/, 
last accessed 1 November 2011.
32 In August 2001 NTT Data conducted this survey on 1,000 people aged 20 and over who resided 
in ten cities in the capital region. See NTT Data, “Denshi Seifu to Minshushugi ni kansuru Shutoken 
Shimin Chōsa” [Investigation report on citizens in the capital region for e-government and democracy], 
December 2001.

















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
facing the challenge of meeting the needs of multi-sectoral climate action. 
The communication processes between local administration and citizens are 
expected to enhance the transparency and social equity of cost-sharing for 
climate action and thus increase personal feelings about the prospect for 
successful citizen participation. 
Over the past decade, some form of direct citizen participation (shimin 
sanka) in local policy making has become common among municipalities. 
The 1993 enactment of the national Basic Environmental Law encouraged 
local governments to prepare their own environmental basic bylaws and 
plans, and the national grant program paid 50 percent of actual costs for 
preparing such plans, in anticipation of compliance with the senshinsei 
(advancement) of planning process (i.e., citizens’ participatory role in the 
process).34 This triggered abrupt increases in the nationally defined inclusion 
of citizens for preparing local environmental plans. As of 2010, Basic 
Environmental Bylaws had been enacted in 55.2 percent of 1,358 local 
governments and Basic Environmental Plans had been prepared by 52.4 
percent of those local governments.35 In preparing their basic environmental 
plans, these local governments normally created a sole participatory 
mechanism, advisory environmental councils (shingikai), whose membership 
composition was similar to the national councils representing business, 
interest groups and academics rather than concerned ordinary citizens.36 
The national top-down promotion had failed to provide much in the way of 
substantial citizen participation in local environmental policy making. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that there are two pioneering cases, 
Toyonaka City37 and Hino City,38 reported as the purely, indeed only faithfully, 
citizen-led environmental policy making: a group of openly invited citizens 
in both cities conducted data collection, site investigation, measurement, 
and assessment and local assemblies adopted their draft plan in March 1999 
and September 1999 respectively. Otherwise, substantial citizen participation 
was reported in a dozen cases of collaboration between citizens and local 
administration for local environmental planning. On balance, therefore, the 
environmental policy-making structure, meant to enhance an individual’s 
sense that they can make a difference—their sense of political efficacy—is 
at an early embryonic stage.
__________________
34 Takahashi Hideyuki, “Jichitai Kankyō Kihon Keikaku no Genjō to Kadai” [The state and 
problems of local basic environmental plans], Kikan Gyōsei Kanri Kenkyū [Administrative Management 
Quarterly] 89 (March 2000): 20-21.
35 In January-March 2011, the Ministry of the Environment conducted this survey on all 1,797 
local governments. See Ministry of the Environment, “Kankyō Kihon Keikaku ni Kakawaru Chihō 
Kōkyō Dantai Ankēto Chōsa” [Survey on basic environmental plans by local government], September 
2011.
36 Takahashi, “Jichitai Kankyō Kihon Keikaku no Genjō to Kadai,” 21-22.
37 Kawasaki Kenji, “Aratana Dankai o Mukaeta Shimin Sanka” [An emerging new phase for 
citizen participation], Chihō Zaimu [Local Finance] 568 (September 2001): 276-77.
38 Kayashima Makoto, “Hinoshi okeru Kankyō Kihon Keiaku Sakutei” [Formulation of Hino 
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Interpersonal trust
A series of nationwide surveys, although providing limited measurement 
indexes used to compare different localities in Japan, indicate that the 
positive relationship is present between social trust and participation.39 The 
2005 Cabinet Office survey asked questions concerning the degree of trust 
in people on a scale of 1 (not trustworthy) to 9 (most trustworthy): 25.6 
percent of “designated cities,” with a population at least 500,000, indicated 
a level 6 or more, compared with cities/towns at 27.8 percent and villages 
28.3 percent, while finding that the rate of regular participation in voluntary 
work was 8.7 percent in designated cities, 13.8 percent in cities/towns, and 
18.2 percent in villages. The levels of both social trust and participation were 
relatively low in major cities such as Tokyo and Osaka while they were higher 
in rural localities. All in all, the higher the level of social trust the greater 
the involvement in voluntary work. It is important to note here that since 
the introduction of the Nonprofit Organization Law in 1998, the number 
of legally registered voluntary organizations rose rapidly to over 45,000 in 
March 2012. The rise of organized voluntary activity in major and medium-
sized cities seems to have produced a new type of social capital, bringing 
different groups together for more inclusive social networks.40 The role of 
these organizations as mobilization agencies is yet to be examined.
Governmental Procedures
Accountability mechanisms 
Making climate change policy work requires the informed participation of 
all stakeholders. Probably the most notable development of information 
disclosure in environmental policy is the introduction of evaluation and 
announcement programs regarding GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions 
reduction. In these programs, large GHG-emitting business facilities are 
required to submit a GHG emissions reduction plan. This plan is evaluated 
and the results are officially announced. As of April 2010, 36 percent (17) 
of 47 prefectures and 32 percent (6) of 19 designated cities were implementing 
such measures at some level.41 In Kyoto City, since 2005, 148 designated 
facilities have been required to submit their CO2 emissions reduction plans 
and outcome reports and these documents have been released to the public.42 
In a similar way, the Tokyo metropolitan government designated 1,332 
__________________
39 See, for example, Japan, Cabinet Office, Sōsharu Kyapitaru [Social capital], 2002 ed., survey 
report, June 2003; Japan, Cabinet Office, Community Regeneration and Social Capital, survey report, 
August 2005; NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, Zenkoku Kenmin Ishiki Chosa [An attitude 
survey on prefectural inhabitants], 1978 and 1996.
40 Japan, Cabinet Office, Sōsharu Kyapitaru, p. 5.
41 Material provided by the Bureau of the Environment, Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 
42 Imai Kunimitsu (Kyoto City Department Chief of Countermeasure Planning for Global 
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
facilities in 2005 and officially announced the evaluation of their submitted 
five-year reduction plans. The experience of information disclosure under 
this system facilitated the consultative process in an effective way for the 2010 
introduction of Tokyo’s cap and trade system targeting large CO2-emitting 
business establishments.43
To make informed citizens active, there are specific modes of participatory 
accountability mechanisms available at the local level of Japan’s climate 
change policy: Local Agenda 21; local Climate Change Action; and local EIA 
(environmental impact assessments).
Local Agenda 21 
In January 1993, for the first time in Japan, Kanagawa prefecture made a 
Local Agenda 21 program, and by March 2003, all remaining 46 prefectures 
and 330 municipalities had followed suit.44 In Japan, the policy area of Local 
Agenda 21 came under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Agency 
(reorganized as the Ministry of the Environment in 2001), which had 
supervised the prefectural adoption (of Local Agenda 21) and the municipal 
adoption via prefectural environmental departments. This narrow, vertical 
tutelage was incapable of effective coordination among environmental and 
non-environmental policy areas. Most municipalities had already had “long-
term comprehensive plans” (sōgō keikaku) at the highest level of local 
governmental plans, as defined in Local Autonomy Law (Article 2-4). Local 
government officials tended to see Local Agenda 21 as one of various 
administration activities, not as a plan to integrate these activities. Unlike 
the ICLEI definition of Local Agenda 21, Japan’s Environmental Agency 
saw Local Agenda 21 as a final product of community plans rather than as 
an interactive process itself between stakeholders for increasing local 
accountability in making communities more sustainable.45 Local Agenda 21 
programs in Japan were consequently reported to indicate peculiar patterns: 
over 70 percent of these Local Agenda 21s were regarded as a mere 
administration plan rather than a societal, voluntary process of local 
community consultation46 and almost all were aimed at a narrowly defined 
environmental issue rather than at a broadly conceived inter-issue-linkage 
of sustainability, except for a few localities such as Kyoto and Minamata Cities 
__________________
43 Chiba Toshiko (Tokyo Metropolitan Department Chief of Global Warming Countermeasures), 
interview by author, 20 May 2010, Tokyo, Japan; Ōno Teruyuki, “Tokyo wa mou Hajimete Imasu” 
[Tokyo has already started!] Gaikō Fōramu [Diplomacy Forum], 260 (March 2010): 42-45.
44 Ministry of the Environment, Press Release, 13 May 2003.
45 See Environmental Agency, “Rōkaruajenda 21 Sakutei Gaido” [Guidelines for formulating 
Local Agenda 21], June 1995.
46 Ministry of the Environment, “Rōkaruagenda 21 no Sakutei Jōkyōtou Chōsa Kekka nit suite” 
[Results on the investigation of the state of Local Agenda 21 programming], March 2003; available 
from http://www.env.go.jp/press/press.php?serial=4101, last accessed 3 December 3 2009; Nakaguchi 
Takahiro, “Nihon no Rōkaruagenda to Rōkaruakushon no Genjō to Kadai” [The state and problem 
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and Nirayama Town, where the integration of planning and action across 
economic, social and environmental spheres was sought.47 
It was reported that, at the first phase of planning and policy making, as 
of March 2003, 40 percent of Local Agenda 21 programs at the prefectural 
level and 67 percent at the municipal level provided citizens with direct 
access to decision making.48 Nonetheless, a very few cases, such as Hikone, 
Joetsu, Kasumigaura, Kyoto and Toyonaka Cities, were recognized as a citizen-
led partnership with local administration that had determined the content 
or direction of Local Agenda 21 programs.49 It was also found that only Osaka 
prefecture had reviewed and altered its Local Agenda 21 program every fiscal 
year while 72 percent of Local Agenda 21 programs at the prefectural level 
and 58 percent at the municipal level were equipped with a program review 
mechanism.50 Overall, the state of Local Agenda 21 adoption in Japan still 
has a long way to go before achieving a participatory process of continual 
policy formation.
Climate Change Action 
Article 4 of the 1998 Climate Change Law states: “Local governments shall 
promote policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the 
natural and social conditions of their areas.” This gives statutory recognition 
to the advantages of decentralization, emphasizing that the nature of 
environmental problems is often location-specific and can be managed at 
different geographical areas. A significant number of Japanese local 
governments have accordingly been implementing their action plans for 
emission reductions in their geographical areas; as of December 2007, 100 
percent (47) of 47 prefectures, 82 percent (14) of 17 designated cities, and 
33 percent (562) of 1,686 small and medium-sized municipalities had drawn 
up such plans.51 It was found that almost all of these plans included emission 
reduction targets and designated reduction measures but only a very few 
__________________
47 Kanagawa Kōji, “Jichitai Keikaku to Pātonashippu Kankei ni okeru Rōkaruagenda 21 no 
Ichizuke” [Positioning Local Agenda 21s in the local planning structure and partnership relations], 
Toshi Kenkyū [Urban Studies] 4 (2004): 43-50.
48 Ministry of the Environment, “Rōkaruagenda 21 no Sakutei Jōkyōtou Chōsa Kekka nit suite.”
49 Kawasaki Kenji, “Shimin to Gyōsei no Pātonāshippu ni yoru Jichitai Kankyō Manējimento” 
[Local environmental management by a partnership between citizens and administration ], Chiiki 
Kaihatsu [Regional Development], 426 (March 2000): 54-62; Japan ICLEI, “Nihon no Jichitai no 
Ajenda 21 Jisshi Jōkyō Chōsa Hōkoku” [Report on the state of practice of Japanese local government’s 
Agenda 21], May 2001.
50 Ministry of the Environment, Press Release, 13 May 2003.
51 Ministry of the Environment, Chihō Kōkyō Dantai ni okeru Chikyū Ondanka Taisaku no Suishin 
ni Kansuru Hōritsu Shikkō Jōkyō Chōsa Kekka. Article 20-3 (2008 amendment to the Climate Change 
Law) obligates prefectures and designated, core and special cities to formulate measures to reduce 
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
plans clearly articulated locally specific measures that were credible or 
achievable for emission reduction targets.52
In December 2004, Kyoto City enacted the Kyoto City Global Warming 
Countermeasures Ordinance to reduce GHG emissions to 10 percent below 
1990 levels by 2010, becoming the first local government in Japan to put 
such a specialized ordinance into effect. Five prefectures (Kyoto and Osaka 
in 2005, Nagano in 2006, Wakayama and Shizuoka in 2007) and two 
municipalities (Kawagoe in 2007 and Chiyoda Ward in 2008) followed suit 
and Kawasaki, Kitakyushu and Yokohama Cities plan to enact such ordinances. 
The ordinance-based countermeasures have been taken partly by the 
recognition that the energy consumption of the Japanese households has 
grown much faster than the industrial sector53 and changes in lifestyle and 
social beliefs are thus crucial to the success of effective GHG emissions 
reduction. The success of such changes requires greater collaboration 
between local administration and citizens for information sharing that 
ensures a better informed citizenry and publicly monitored administrative 
decisions. As of 2010, 42 percent of 1,358 local governments had been 
practicing some forms of collaboration with citizens for emission reduction 
countermeasures, yet only 10 percent of these collaborative schemes had 
been initiated or requested by their local residents.54 In other words, a large 
majority of collaborations had been led by local administration. 
Stakeholder meetings for the introduction of Tokyo’s cap and trade system 
are regarded as one such administration-led collaboration. At the 2007 
meetings, the Tokyo metropolitan government successfully sought ex-post-
facto approval of administrative initiatives from business establishments, 
environmental NGOs and academics.55 Since the administration-led system, 
targeted for mandatory emission reductions among big emitters, was well 
prepared and well documented, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, along 
with the general public, came to fully support the cap and trade system in 
2008.56 Kyoto City is another active locality yet with a citizen-led, rather than 
administration-led, approach to collaboration. Its Miyako Agenda 21 Forum 
(as of 2008, consisting of 551 members, made up of citizens’ groups, 
academics and business associations), which works in collaboration with local 
__________________
52 Ministry of the Environment, Chihō Kōkyō Dantai ni okeru Chikyū Ondanka Taisaku no Suishin ni 
Kansuru Hōritsu Shikkō Jōkyō Chōsa Kekka, 57-58; Wada and Taura, Shimin Chiiki ga Susumeru Chikyū 
Ondanka Bōshi, 32-33.
53 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Enerugī Hakusho [White paper of energy], 2010 ed., 
chapters 1-1-2; available from http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2010energyhtml/, last 
accessed 3 November 2011.
54 See Ministry of the Environment, “Kankyō Kihon Keikaku ni Kakawaru Chihō Kōkyō Dantai 
Ankēto Chōsa,” 62, 70.
55 Tokyo Metropolitan Government, “Sutēkihorudā Mītingu” [Stakeholder Meetings]; available 
from http://www2.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/kikaku/kikouhendouhousin/index.htm, last accessed 21 
May 2010.
56 Chiba, Interview by author, 20 May 2010, Tokyo; Okamoto Naomi (Tokyo Metropolitan Section 
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administration, has promoted action plans towards achieving a low carbon 
city and has engaged in a range of educational promotions for raising public 
awareness.57
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) 
Long before the 1997 enactment of the national Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law (EIA law), some local governments had already implemented 
relatively comprehensive assessments, responding to public pressure to take 
preventive measures rather than ex-post countermeasures against industrial 
pollution.58 Kawasaki City was the first local government in Japan to enact 
an Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance in 1976 while both the 
Tokyo Metropolitan government and Kanagawa prefecture followed suit in 
1980. As of April 2010, all major localities (47 prefectures and 15 designated 
cities) enacted their EIA ordinances under the direction of the national EIA 
law.59 The objective of local EIA was to carry it out “within the law” but to 
also apply it more flexibly than the national law designated, in order to cover 
smaller and more diverse projects for meeting local needs. 
All local EIA procedures have independent review commissions (shinsakai), 
which act as advisory assessors to provide technical/expert opinions at various 
stages of EIA. Most local EIA ordinances also stipulate an administrative 
obligation for public hearings (kōchōkai) that local chief executives consider 
necessary to hold at any stage. Equally important, EIA brings citizen 
participation to a new dimension. In the area of industrial pollution, the 
third party (the general public) had not been specifically stipulated in Japan’s 
legal system and thus normally could not act as a formal participant, yet EIA 
has provided a new way of opening up the scope of participation to the 
general public. In fact, most local EIA procedures define participants as 
“those who have opinions from the standpoint of protecting the environment” 
(no geographically defined limits).60 Nonetheless, there is a major problem 
commonly found in these local EIA systems; consultation at an early stage 
of projects does not normally fall within the scope of EIA, and thus the public 
finds it impossible to consider alternatives to the proposed projects. As of 
2004, three prefectures (Tokyo, Hokkaido and Hyogo) and one municipality 
(Zushi) had an institutionalized system of citizen participation explicitly 
__________________
57 Kitagawa, interview by author, 13 May 2010, Kyoto; Imai, Interview by author, 18 May 2010, 
Kyoto. 
58 Tanaka Mitsuru and Okiyama Fumitoshi, “Chihō Kōkyō Dantai ni okeru Kankyō Asesumento 
Sēdo no Rekishi kara no Kyōkun” [Lessons on the history of environmental impact assessment by 
Japanese local governments], Asesumento Gakkaishi [Journal of Environmental Impact Assessment] 
8, no. 2 (August 2010): 6-16.
59 Ministry of the Environment, Environmental Impact Assessment Network; available from http://
www.env.go.jp/policy/assess/6-1system/index.html, last accessed 3 November 2011. 
60 Yanagi Ken’ichirō, “Chihō Jichitai Asesu Jōrei no Saikin no Dōkō Bunseki” [A recent trend 

















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
prescribed in their EIA ordinances, and three prefectures (Tokyo, Saitama 
and Mie) and two municipalities (Kyoto and Kawasaki) had an EIA 
mechanism for early draft plans, which was embedded in their EIA 
ordinances.61 The only exception is the Tokyo metropolitan government, 
which, to ensure public consultation at an early stage, uses its EIA as a 
planning tool when projects are conceived and planned and to assess them 
for integrating environmental, social and economic considerations in 
decision making.
Officials’ attentiveness 
In Japan, the capacity of local assemblies to keep their chief executives in 
check has been seriously constrained by the phenomenon of ōru yotōka (all 
parties ruling together without political opposition).62 As a result, incentives 
for local officials’ attentiveness are largely institutionalized in their executive 
branches, providing a way of reaching out to citizens in a direct way. The 
effectiveness of local government’s attentiveness to what the people think 
significantly derives from local administration. Under the presidential system, 
Japanese local governments have directly elected mayors or governors. These 
chief executives have greater control over an entire government personnel 
and organization than the prime minister does at the national level. In 
general, local authorities, the layer of government closest to the people, are 
under constant pressure to quickly respond to popular demands. In the field 
of local environmental policy in Japan, there are two areas of development 
for incentive structures to officials’ attentiveness: environmental performance 
disclosure and environmental policy coordination.
Environmental Performance Disclosure
In general, sub-national government ensures better information disclosure 
than national government does. Local governments are not distracted by 
the secrecy needed in “high politics.” The number of local government 
disclosure ordinances rose rapidly from 56 in 1985 to 178 in 1990; as of April 
2009, 99.7 percent (1,842) of all local governments in Japan were providing 
disclosure at some level.63 The information release ratio by the Tokyo 
Metropolitan government between 2000 and 2004, for example, was 97 
percent of 13,402 disclosure requests.64 Indeed, the information disclosure 
__________________
61 Ministry of the Environment, “Senryakuteki Kankyō Eikyō Hyōka ni tsuite” [Strategic 
Environmental Assessment]; available from http://www.env.go.jp/council/02policy/y0210-04/mat06.
pdf, last accessed 3 December 2009.
62 In 2010 over 99 percent of mayoral proposals sailed through local assemblies almost intact. 
See National Association of Chairpersons of City Councils, “Shichō Tēshutsu ni yoru Gian” [Mayor-
proposed agenda items]; available from http://www.si-gichokai.jp/official/research/jittai22/
pdf/08_jittai22.pdf, last accessed 3 November 2011.
63 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Press Release, 7 August 2009.
64 Release Ratio = (Release + Partial Release) / (Cases Claimed – No Existence of Information). 
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of government performance has become a common practice among 
prefectures and major cities; those authorities introducing a government 
performance appraisal system increased markedly from 18.1 percent of all 
local governments in 2004 to 54.4 percent in 2010 (98 percent of 47 
prefectures and 95 percent of 18 designated cities).65 It should be noted that 
there are no legal obligations for local authorities either to introduce such 
a system or to comply with a nationally defined way of evaluation when they 
decide to introduce. Performance evaluation is generally carried out by their 
administrative organizations (self-evaluation) and primarily focuses on a 
post-facto examination of project outcomes. Yet there is some evidence that 
the number of local governments implementing their evaluation at the policy 
level as well as at the program level is on the increase: 39 percent of prefectures 
and 22 percent of designated cities.66 In this context, the use of both the 
specific policy level and ante-facto evaluation for EIA, as described previously, 
is likely to provide a greater incentive to local officials’ attentiveness. 
Environmental Policy Coordination
In Japan, environment and pollution control agreements (EPCAs) with 
specific enterprises have been an effective measure of local environmental 
policy to regulate major “point source polluters.” In 1993 there were 42,000 
such agreements between local authorities and individual enterprises.67 Yet 
there had been a lack of implementation transparency in EPCAs. As the scope 
of local environmental policies expanded beyond industrial pollution control, 
the enactment of local ordinances was necessary in order to clarify on what 
legal grounds local authorities could exercise their power over diffuse, “no-
point sources” of pressures on the environment. In the early 1990s, as the 
objectives of Japan’ environmental policy moved away from one-dimensional 
pollution control toward a sustainable society and environment, the scope 
of regulatory objects was to expand from business activities through city 
planning to consumer behaviour. The expansion of policy scope necessitated 
policy coordination between environmental and other departments and 
required expertise for a diverse set of administrative tools. 
When responsibilities overlap, conflict may result. Inter-departmental 
coordination is thus required. There have been more examples of 
institutionalization for “comprehensive environmental policy-making.” One 
such example is the creation of a Global Warming Countermeasures 
Promotion Office, which is expected to draw up large-scale GHG emissions 
reduction plans, to be implemented on a top-down basis. This office is usually 
attached to the chief executives’ office for policy coordination. As of 2009, 
__________________
65 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Press Release, 16 March 2011.
66 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Press Release, 16 March 2011.
67 Ministry of the Environment, Chihō Kōkyō Dantai no Kankyō Hozen Taisaku Chōsa [Investigation 
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
eight prefectures and six designated cities operated such headquarters for 
climate change policy.68 Some local governments recognize that jinji-idō 
(organization-wide job rotation practice), which is carried out every year 
before the new fiscal year starts in April, would disrupt policy continuity and 
prevent employees from developing their expertise. To overcome the adverse 
effects of personnel reshuffle, in 2009 Kyoto City created a new job 
classification, kankyō-shoku (environmental specialists) for managing 
environmental issues.69 Informally, the Tokyo metropolitan government has 
been giving a priority to employees’ preferences for personnel reshuffle. As 




It appears that chief executives of localities with a larger population (or 
larger tax base) tend to see themselves as administratively more able to 
exercise their discretion in carrying out responsibilities. According to a survey 
of local chief executives’ perceptions (allowing only yes or no responses), 
49.6 percent of 1,905 respondents saw local government as lacking the 
competency to carry out the responsibilities demanded by decentralization. 
The percentages of prefectures (100 percent) and cities (70.2 percent) 
claiming to be competent, as compared with towns and villages (39.1 
percent), were large enough to call this finding into question.71 
Political Leadership 
A large majority of Japanese local authorities have displayed copycatting 
behaviour (yokonarabi) in regards to climate change policy by implementing 
nationally subsidized policy measures or following nationally defined policy 
measures that neighbouring localities have adopted. Under these 
circumstances, a number of case studies have come to the conclusion that 
political leadership—usually mayoral or gubernatorial leadership—is a key 
ingredient in a local government’s ability to introduce progressive low carbon 
measures.72 It was reported that, without some form of commitment from 
__________________
68 Local Green Government Portal, Local Green Government Portal; available from http://www.
climate-lg.jp/policy/gw-city.html, last accessed 14 December 2009.
69 In Japan, positions for local government employees are typically classified into two categories: 
ippan-shoku (generalists) and gijutsu-shoku (technical employees). Kyoto City was the first municipality 
to create such a classification for policy continuity and expertise accumulation.
70 Chiba, Interview by author, 20 May 2010, Tokyo.
71 Sankei Shinbun, 8 January 1996, carried a report on the survey of 1,905 chief executives (57.7 
percent of all local chief executives) in Japan.
72 See, for example, Itakura Toshimasa, “Shimin Sanka ni yoru Kankyō Jōrei Zukuri” [Making 
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the chief executive, progressive proposals may never get onto a policy agenda 
despite being initially presented by an informal policy network of those 
(government officials, NGOs and academics) interested in low carbon issues.73 
At the stage of policy formation, however, the exercise of the chief executive’s 
power may not promote but rather undermine the policy rationale if it is 
politicized to the extent to which there exist tensions between the chief 
executives and local assemblies or influential local figures (as seen when 
Tokyo Governor Ishihara strained relations with big business over his 
intention to introduce Tokyo’s cap-and-trade in 2002-2007).74 From the 
viewpoint of local administration, the department concerned is less likely to 
commit itself to progressive policy making if there are such tensions or there 
is a high likelihood of changing hands to a new chief executive (as when 
Nagano Governor Tanaka failed to win the goodwill of his government 
officials for cooperation in 2002-2006).75 To make these recalcitrant actors 
commit to or support progressive low carbon measures, the ideal chief 
executive would require sufficient financial resources and political 
opportunities to be exploited by political leadership (as Ishihara’s bid for 
the 2016 Olympic Games, under the slogan, “Carbon Minus Olympics,” 
legitimized stringent mitigation measures in 2006).76
Administrative Ability 
As of April 2004, the total number of local government employees in 
environmental administration stood at 14,518 (8,252 for pollution and 6,266 
for environmental conservation). Within the context of administrative 
reforms, the overall size of local administration in terms of employment had 
decreased by nearly 10 percent between 1993 and 2004; in contrast, the 
number of local government employees in environmental conservation 
increased rapidly by 52 percent during the same period. In every prefecture 
and designated city, along with a bureau for environmental administration 
(177 employees on the prefectural average and 198 employees on the 
designated-city average), multiple sections were established within this 
environmental bureau. As far as other municipalities were concerned, only 
__________________
24, no. 3 (September 2001); 78; Baba Kenshi, Aoki Kazumasu and Kimura Osamu, “Analysis of 
Environmental and Energy Policy Processes in Local Governments in Japan,” Denryoku Chūo Kenkyūjo 
Hōkoku [Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry Report] Socio-economic Research Center, 
Rep. No. Y05025 (May 2006): ii; Fujii Yasuhira, “Tokubetsuku ni okeru Kankyō Kihon Jōrei no Seitei 
Katei Bunsei” [Analysis of basic environmental ordinance-making processes in Special Wards], Sōkan 
Shakai Kagaku [Relative Social Sciences] 17 (2007): 76.
73 Aoki Kazumasu, “Senkuteki na Jichitai Ondanka Bōshi Seisaku no Seihi o Meguru Seisaku 
Katei Bunseki” [Policy analysis of progressive preventive-measures for climate change by local 
governments], Tomidai Keizai Ronshu [Economic Journal of Toyama University] 56, no. 2 (November 
2010): 136-39.
74 Chiba, Interview by author, 20 May 2010, Tokyo; Okamoto, Interview by author, 23 June 2011.
75 Aoki, “Senkuteki na Jichitai Ondanka Bōshi Seisaku no Seihi o Meguru Seisaku Katei Bunseki,” 
144-47.
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
13 percent (233 municipalities) had an independent department of 
environmental administration. In nearly 90 percent of municipalities with 
populations of less than 10,000, and in about 66 percent of municipalities 
with populations of more than 10,000 but less than 30,000, there was no 
specialist responsible for environmental administration.77 
In 1998 Shiroi Town in Chiba prefecture was the first local government 
in Japan to acquire the ISO 14001 (international environmental management 
standards) certificate, in order to take initiatives in promoting projects that 
would reduce the burden on the environment. The number of ISO 14001 
accredited local governments grew rapidly, peaking at 513 localities in 2004 
and declined to 269 localities in 2009. This decline was due primarily to an 
amalgamation of localities but also to the introduction of new standards of 
EMS (environmental management system), such as LAS-E (Local Authority’s 
Standards in the Environment). As ISO 14001 had been initially used for 
manufacturing facilities, by 2008 32 percent of ISO 14001 accredited local 
governments declared they were going to adapt ISO 14001 as their own.78 
As of January 2008, 37 percent of local governments were performing under 
some form of EMS and 22 percent of these had developed their own EMS 
systems.79 
In a broad sense, performance evaluation for local climate adaptation 
needs to focus not only on the evaluation of individual projects, but also that 
of policy making and policy implementation as a whole. As of October 2010, 
54 percent of Japanese local governments (977)—98 percent of prefectures, 
95 percent of designated cities, 78 percent of other cities, and 30 percent of 
towns/villages—have introduced a system of administrative evaluation.80 Yet 
a Mitsubishi Research Institute survey, conducted in 2009, indicates that only 
9 percent of 490 cities have incorporated policy evaluation as part of their 
administrative evaluation while 34 percent of these cities have adopted 
implementation evaluation and 70 percent have conducted project evaluation 
(on a case-by-case basis) within their administrative evaluation.81
Financial Capacity 
Massive budget deficits have remained in most Japanese local governments 
as their spending has far exceeded revenues. Since the early 1990s, their 
__________________
77 The figures in this section is based on a report, “Chihō Kōkyō Dantai no Jōkyō ni tsuite” [The 
situation of local governments], provided on 17 March 2005 at a General Policy Meeting of the Central 
Environment Council.
78 The figures of ISO 14001 are provided by the Japan Accreditation Board.
79 The figures are based on a survey on environmental management, conducted by the Knowledge 
Management Research & Institute in January 2008, with 685 respondents of local governments.
80 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, “Chihō Kōkyō Dantai ni okeru Gyōsei Hyōka 
no Torikumi Jōkyō” [The state of administrative evaluation by local governments], Press Release, 16 
March 2011.
81 In August-September 2009, Mitsubishi Research Institute conducted a survey on administrative 
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budget deficits and outstanding debt have increased significantly. Existing 
local borrowing as a percentage of GDP rose rapidly from 15.5 percent in 
1991 (when the bubble economy burst) to 38.1 percent in 2007. In fiscal 
year 2005, 27.5 percent (514) out of all local governments (1,874) showed 
more than 18 percent of borrowing burden ratio (debt service / total value 
of ordinary financial resources). Only Tokyo Metropolis seemed to stand 
out in this fiscal crisis with US$2,450 in fiscal year 2005 of its per capita local 
tax revenue amounting to roughly twice the level of the prefectural average.82 
In this respect, there is a potential for financially weak local authorities to 
move towards lax emissions control standards (or fiscal crisis as an incentive 
to be a free rider on the environmental protection effort of others) in order 
to increase their tax base. 
Some areas of climate policy such as economic incentives require a 
significant degree of fiscal autonomy and capacity at the local government 
level. By December 2007, 238 municipal programs were reported to offer 
subsidies, funding and/or tax incentives for the promotion of energy 
efficiency and new energy.83 So far the Tokyo metropolitan government is 
the only local government in Japan that is able to implement a package of 
these measures as a comprehensive system of environmental policies. In 2009 
it started its own tax system to promote energy saving for small-and-medium-
sized companies.84 Its fiscal elasticity significantly affects the scope of Tokyo 
metropolitan initiatives. The Tokyo metropolitan government has a great 
deal of freedom for budgetary choice, which allows it to offer a more 
comprehensive incentive program for climate change adaptation, though it 
is constrained by nationally defined revenue-raising regulations like any 
other local government.
Fairness of government outputs
To assure greater fairness, projects need to be assessed at the early stage of 
problem identification and throughout the planning and decision-making 
processes. In Japan, only a few local authorities, such as Kobe and Kawasaki 
Cities, have carried out a comprehensive process of evaluating the 
environmental impact of policies, plans or individual projects and their 
alternatives at earlier stages. Probably the most advanced process is found 
in a new practice of the Tokyo metropolitan EIA, which was revised in 2002. 
Under this EIA, the Tokyo metropolitan government has assessed the 
environmental impact of projects at earlier stages and responded to the 
cumulative, compound environmental impact in greater-area development 
__________________
82 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Local Public Finance in Japan; available from 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/english/pdf/lpfij.pdf, last accessed 14 December 2009. 
83 Ministry of the Environment, Chihō Kōkyō Dantai ni okeru Chikyū Ondanka Taisaku no Suishin ni 
Kansuru Hōritsu Shikkō Jōkyō Chōsa Kekka.
















































































Making Climate Change Policy Work
plans.85 But it is important to note that such progressive measures are 
confined to a small minority of front-runner localities in Japan. 
Citizen participation is a key determinant in fostering fairness of the policy 
process. A number of case studies on Japanese localities do point to two 
driving forces for promoting environmental equity: socially mobilized citizens 
and mayoral/gubernatorial leadership.86 Using the frameworks of political 
opportunity structures,87 it can be argued that the enabling institutional 
environment for a greater degree of participation provides citizens with 
access to a local government’s capacity to enhance environmental equity. 
The formal institutional access, which provides incentives for civil society 
participation to thrive in fair decision making, ranges from the legal-
administrative institution of central-local relations, electoral systems, to party 
systems and political alliances. However, those case studies illustrate that the 
opportunity structure for direct forms of citizen participation, which appears 
to be either empowered or constrained by demographics, played a primary 
role in promoting environmental equity. Although a lack of case studies 
makes my observation only suggestive rather than definitive, there seems to 
be a threshold size, probably exceeded only in the multi-million population 
cities, at which the greater number of organizations and the more complex 
decision-making processes come to outweigh the political efficacy of direct 
forms of citizen involvement. Equally important, no reports on the smaller 
size categories of fewer than 30,000 people (as of 2011, 869 out of 1746 
municipalities) are found in those case studies. I would expect less political 
actors involved in small villages that are less complex and reveal less diversity. 
Within this limit, the smallness of local governments is likely to nurture 
political participation by virtue of their accessibility and intimacy. 
The direct forms of citizen involvement for promoting overall fairness 
can be categorized into three basic patterns: doing citizens’ planning on 
their own with the help of relatively neutral municipal authorities (Hino 
City’s Basic Environmental Plan in 1999, with a population of 170,000, 
Toyonaka City’s Agenda 21 in 1999 with a population of 390,000); citizens’ 
planning collaboration on equal terms with local administration (Hikone 
City’s Basic Environmental, and Action Plans in 2001 with a population of 
110,000 and Shiki City’s Basic Environmental Plan and Eco City in 1999 with 
__________________
85 Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Environmental Impact Assessment System of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government (Tokyo: TMG, 2006). 
86 See, for example, Itakura, “Shimin Sanka ni yoru Kankyō Jōrei Zukuri,” 73-78; Fujii, 
“Tokubetsuku ni okeru Kankyō Kihon Jōrei no Seitei Katei Bunsei,” 71-77 Hiraoka and Wada, “Chihō 
Jichitai ni okeru Shiminsankagata no Chikyū Ondanka Taisaku o Suishinsuru Shikumi to Shakaiteki 
Haikei,” 47-53. 
87 Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of 
Protest (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Centre for International Studies, 1991); Hanspeter Kriesi, “The 
Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: its Impact on their Mobilization,” in The 
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a population of 65,000); citizens’ agenda setting and local administration’s 
planning (Date City’s Basic Environmental Plan in 1999 with a population 
of 35,000 and Ichikawa City’s Basic Environmental Plan in 2000 with a 
population of 450,000).88 
Conclusion
Since the early 1990s, the focus of Japan’s environmental policy has shifted 
from one-dimensional industrial pollution control to a comprehensive 
environmental governance strategy. Local officials have limited capacity 
to handle diffuse pressures on the environment, which requires their 
accountability mechanisms as well as their accumulated expertise and 
encouragement of citizens’ political involvement. The international 
agreement made by Japan to reduce GHG emissions puts pressure on local 
authorities to take initiatives for climate adaptation. Most Japanese localities 
have yet to take policy initiatives in response to such pressure.
This study concludes that in Japan, with regard to the government’s 
competence/efficiency, only the largest municipalities and prefectures 
possess a substantial degree of expertise and resources that they can use to 
reduce urban energy intensity and CO2 emissions. Depending on their local 
capacity for political leadership, administrative ability and financial 
discretion, some forward-looking localities have been ushering in a new level 
of development for operating innovative environmental programs. Probably 
the most exceptional case is the Tokyo metropolitan government, whose 
strong independent sources of revenue allow for a comprehensive system of 
climate policy including the 2010 introduction of its cap-and-trade system.
Yet efficiency and equity are seen as trade-offs against each other. In large 
localities, the size of the population appears to be too large and diverse to 
facilitate direct forms of participation for ensuring the fairness of the 
government’s outputs. Instead, the large localities tend to address the issue 
of policy process fairness, such as EIA, at earlier stages. It is only in pioneering 
medium-sized municipalities that mobilized citizen groups demonstrate some 
success in holding governmental procedures accountable and responsive to 
their communities in a direct way. Direct participation itself becomes a 
process of spontaneous learning, a means for citizens to gain significant 
subjective political competence and to develop quasi-professional expertise 
on climate change. 
Curtin University, Perth, Australia, August 2012 
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